Constructing the ratio of CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting

I opened a book today – one that I’ve not needed to look at since 1973.  In fact, I don’t think I could have looked at it too much, even back then. The pages were in pretty good condition…

The book is Maher, Waller & Derham (1971) Cases and Materials on the Legal Process (2 ed).  I opened it because I needed to refresh my memory (now fading) about the relationship between the binding rule of a case (its “ratio decidendi”) and its material facts. I wanted to do that because several aspects of the High Court’s recent decision in CFMMEU v Contracting Personnel were causing some panic in the labour hire industry, and I wanted to see if it was justified.

The aspects that were proving especially troublesome were those passages in the judgments that seemed to be suggesting that, as a matter of binding principle, the mere making of a promise to work through a labour hire firm might be enough to make a person that firm’s employee – if the promise were used by the labour hire firm in running its business, as of course it is. 

Such a principle, if indeed it were the correct principle to extract from the case, seemed to conflate the “control test” with the “integration” or “organizational test”, applying selected elements of the “multi-factorial test” (though only to the terms of the written contract – mostly), whilst viewing all through the “prism” of the “own business test”, or something not entirely unlike it.

Heaven help us if we’re teaching employment law this semester!

But there, on pages 113-114 of my cherished copy of Maher, Waller & Derham, purchased at the exorbitant price of $8.50, was what I was looking for – a lucid but barely remembered account of the relationship between the binding rule of a case and its facts, showing how the material facts of Donoghue v Stevenson (the famed “snail-in-the-ginger-beer-case”) could be divided into fact families, the members of which could be “stated at various levels of generality”.

Applying the method recommended by those esteemed authors, I was able to discern four families of important facts that might go some way towards explaining what the High Court really said, and which might allay some of the alarm currently circulating through the labour hire industry.   

I’ll set them out, and then see if I can combine them into a workable statement of principle.

  1. Facts as to the worker’s identity & capacity: The worker was an individual, not in his own business.
  2. Facts as to the contract: The contract with the labour hire firm was wholly in writing.
  3. Facts as to preservation of independence: the worker’s promise to perform work for the labour hire firm’s clients as directed was not subject to a sufficient reservation of independence – eg. as to what work he would do or how he would do it.
  4. Facts as to the labour hire firm’s control and use of the worker’s promise: The labour hire firm controlled and used the worker’s promise as an asset in its business.

It’s going to be difficult for labour hire firms to avoid #2 and #4.  But #1 and #3 might suggest there is some scope to fashion a different outcome in some cases.

So, here’s a first attempt to extract the principle in CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting:

Where A, being an individual not in business for themselves, makes a promise to B, in a wholly written contract without sufficient reservation of independence, to perform work for C, which promise B controls and uses in its business, then A may be characterized as B’s employee.

Don’t hold me to that. I’ll need time to refine it. In fact, it might not be settled until later courts tell us what the High Court really meant. But might it work?  Might it keep the doors of a few locum agencies and professional on-hire firms open a bit longer?

Here’s hoping a court that needs to consider the issue in a different occupational context might think so!

Andrew C. Wood

On-hire contracting after CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting: Has labour become a commodity?

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The Conference reaffirms the fundamental principles on which the Organization is based and, in particular, that:

(a) labour is not a commodity;

ILO Declaration of Philadelphia 10th May, 1944

Whilst the outcome seems intuitively sound – a young UK backpacker, working as a casual labourer on someone’s building site, is surely an employee – on looking a bit more deeply into the High Court’s reasoning in CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting, I’m beginning to wonder whether the Court’s approach to the back-to-back contracts accords with the reality of the on-hire business model, and whether the decision shows signs of treating labour as a commodity. 

It’s always risky to paraphrase what the High Court says, but basically, what it appears to have said in this case is that, if you’ve got a contract with a labour hire firm to perform work for its clients, then you’re its employee because, through that contract, it controls the provision of your labour. (Kiefel CJ and Keane & Edelman JJ at para [89]).

Abstracting their honours’ reasoning at para [90], you discover that if your work is “dependent upon, and subservient to” someone else’s business through back-to-back contracts, then you must be that person’s employee – you’re working under a contract of service.

Gaegler and Gleeson JJ appear to have adopted much the same approach saying, at para [158]:

…by supplying his labour to Hanssen [the host], Mr McCourt was at the same time supplying his labour to Construct [the labour hire firm] for the purposes of Construct’s business.

You could almost see how that is intuitively sound in the case of a young UK backpacker supplied to work as a construction labourer.  But, to be sound in principle, it has to be capable of wider application. And it’s at that point that the approach adopted by the High Court warrants closer scrutiny.

To test it, take the key passage from the joint judgment of Kiefel CJ and Keane & Edelman JJ at para [89], and simply swap the names and context around to apply to a medical locum agency. Then ask yourselves whether the result is still intuitively sound.

Here it is in translation. The names of the agency and the client are, of course, fictitious:

89  Under the Locum Agreement, Dr McCourt promised LocumsNow to work as directed by LocumsNow and by LocumNow’s customer, Whiteacre Health Service District. Dr McCourt was entitled to be paid by LocumsNow in return for the work he performed pursuant to that promise. That promise to work for LocumsNow’s customer, and his entitlement to be paid for that work, were at the core of LocumsNow’s business of providing [medical] labour to its customers. The right to control the provision of Dr McCourt’s labour was an essential asset of that business. Dr McCourt’s performance of work for, and at the direction of, Whiteacre HSD was a direct result of the deployment by LocumsNow of this asset in the course of its ongoing relationship with its customer.

We can do the same thing with the corresponding passage from the judgment of Gaegler and Gleeson JJ at para [158]:

158 …by supplying his labour to Whiteacre HSD, Dr McCourt was at the same time supplying his labour to LocumsNow for the purposes of LocumsNow’s business.

This sounds dangerously like the heresy of treating labour as a commodity.

What patients were treated at the office of the labour hire firm? A locum agency doesn’t provide, supply, or perform medical labour or services. It arranges for its locums to attend hospitals and health practices to supply the medical services required by the hospital or health practice.  That does not make the locum’s work “dependent upon, and subservient to” the agency’s business in any way that compromises the independence of the locum such as to make them the agency’s employee. It does not place them in service of the locum agency.

Neither does a locum agency’s business model involve the acquisition of medical labour or services; it merely involves the acquisition of contractual rights, freely bargained for, which it utilises to discharge its contractual agreement to provide workforce services to facilitate the marshalling of its client’s workforce.

Its workforce services comprise, not the supply of medical services, or the performance of medical services; but rather, the making of arrangements for their supply.

What, I suspect, will now become critical in distinguishing between on-hire employment and on-hire (independent) contracting will be the extent to which those arrangements compromise, or preserve, the capacity for the locum to work independently in the performance of his or her work – including in the absence of needing to demonstrate the exercise of entrepreneurial skill on his or her own account.

The same would be true for any professional locum agency and its locums.

And it is true, at a conceptual level, for on-hire providers in any sector – horticulture, engineering, logistics, teaching, cleaning, aged care etc.  

What the decision seems to require is a reappraisal of the Court’s understanding of “control” as it was laid down in Zuijs (1955) and in Stevens v Brodribb (1986). And perhaps that’s the direction in which a legislative solution now needs to be found.

It’s sometimes said that, “hard cases make bad law”.  This case may prove the saying true.

Andrew C. Wood

Review your “Odco” arrangements…NOW!

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On Wednesday, the High Court of Australia delivered its decision in CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting, holding that a UK backpacker, who was engaged and supplied by Perth-based Labour Hire firm, Personnel Contracting, as an independent contractor under the “Odco” system was, in fact, an employee. As a result, you should review your “Odco” arrangements … now!

The majority decisions

Three of the seven High Court judges, Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ, considered that the original Odco Case, and subsequent cases that relied on it, contained “an error”, which represented “a departure from principle which should not be perpetuated” (para 59).

Two of the judges, Gageler and Gleeson JJ, thought that the present case differed from Odco because:

  1. the subject-matter of the contracts in Odco was not unambiguously hourly labour;
  2. the contracts between the workers and the labour hire company in the Odco cases did not oblige the workers to supply labour in a “safe, competent and diligent manner” (as they did in this case), but simply to “carry out all work” which the workers agreed with the clients of the labour hire company to do and which the workers “guaranteed against faulty workmanship”; and
  3. most importantly, unlike the terms of business used by Personnel Contracting in this case, nothing in the terms of business between the labour hire firm in the Odco cases and Odco’s clients placed Odco’s workers under the direction and control of the clients.

That was enough to allow the two judges to say that Odco should not be followed in the present case (paras 157 – 158).

Gordon J did not expressly deal with the Odco Case but decided, after considering the “totality of the relationship” as evidenced by the work contract, that the relationship was one of employment, not one of independent contract (para 200). The issue was not so much whether the worker was “in business for himself”; but whether his work was performed in the business or enterprise of Personnel Contracting.

It’s a very subtle distinction to make; but an important one, because (as explained at paras. 182-183) it enables the Court to focus solely on the legal rights and obligations set out in the contract, avoiding any inquiry into “subsequent conduct” of the parties or into whether the worker’s set up demonstrates “the hallmarks of a business”. In this respect, it is consistent with the approach adopted by the High Court in WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato.

A sole dissenting voice

Steward J, delivering the only dissenting judgment, was not prepared to stray from Odco. Drawing on a 2005 Parliamentary Report, his Honour pointed out (at para. 210) that:

‘Odco’ arrangements operate in a range of industries. Independent contractors working under this system include farm hands, doctors, secretaries, personal assistants, family day‑care workers, fishermen, salespeople, cleaners, security guards and building workers.

Serious challenges now face labour hire firms using the “Odco” method

His Honour’s explanation for not departing from the Odco Cases will be seen by many as forecasting the serious challenges that labour hire firms, who have relied on the Odco system, now face. At para. 222 his Honour stated:

Whilst this is not a criminal law case, overturning the Full Court’s decision in Odco would expose the respondent to significant penalties on a retrospective basis. That is unfair. It will also… greatly damage the respondent’s business and the businesses of many others. That is undesirable. It will also potentially deny to workers a choice they may wish to make to supply their labour as independent contractors, thus possibly undermining one of the objects of the Independent Contractors Act. Given the severity of these potential consequences, which will apply retrospectively, the fate of the Full Court’s decision in Odco should be a matter left for the legislative branch of government to consider.

Fallout

His dire warnings, may have many scrambling to undo their Odco arrangements in the fallout, and to put in place “compliance partnerships” with the FWO … unless the legislative branch of the government intervenes.

Though I can’t see that happening quickly … can you?

Andrew C. Wood

Independent Contracting: Back in the Spotlight

Photo by tyler hendy on Pexels.com two spotlights.

Labour hire providers should note that there are currently two appeals before the High Court, which challenge accepted approaches to the characterisation of independent contractors. The outcomes could upset independent contracting arrangements that are overly dependent on the technicalities and “deep entrenchment” of the Odco system and may lead staffing agencies to a fresh need to review their use of independent contractors.

CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting[1]

Trial

A young UK backpacker, who “had no aspect of a business or intended business, no expressed desire to act in any capacity other than as a builder’s labourer, and merely sought remuneration for the deployment of his labour on a building site supervised, directed and controlled by the builder”[2] was characterised, at first instance,[3] as an independent contractor on an application of the multi-factor test and Odco principles.

Appeal

The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia upheld the finding despite the absence of any business clearly having been carried on by the worker.[4] However, in doing so, the Chief Justice expressed a preference for a different outcome though feeling constrained by intermediate appellate decisions which had previously supported Odco contracting arrangements.[5]

Special Leave

The High Court granted special leave to appeal in February this year. The Appellant’s submissions were filed last Friday (16 April 2021).

At issue is a question of whether the multi-factor test was correctly applied in a labour-hire context. There is a related question about the need for workers to be carrying on their own independent businesses in order to be independent contractors.

ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek & Ors[6]

Trial

The case concerned the various entitlements of truck drivers, who derived their sole income by working for same business for nearly 40 years – and the corresponding obligations of the company for which they worked. It’s not a labour hire case, but it raises similar characterisation questions about the role of the business test in determining whether workers are employees or independent contractors.

The drivers were required to purchase a truck to retain work and contracted with the company through their family partnerships, which owned the trucks.  The drivers were required to be available to work during set hours. The company logo was displayed on drivers’ trucks and company branding appeared on the drivers’ clothing. Although the drivers theoretically may have had the ability of sell their goodwill, they had no practical capacity to generate any goodwill of their own.

On an application of the multi-factor test the drivers were held to be independent contractors.[7] A deciding factor was that the workers were held to be running businesses of their own.[8]

Appeal

The Full Federal Court reversed the decision on appeal.[9]  Wigney J’s judgment highlights the problems facing those who rely too much on cleverly crafted documents and overly sophisticated or artificial arrangements.

To my mind, the primary judge concluded as he did by giving primacy and excessive weight to contractual labels and theoretical possibilities and insufficient weight to the reality and totality of the working relationship between the parties, as demonstrated by the way they actually conducted themselves over many years.”[10]

Although the drivers’ arrangements displayed some of the trappings of carrying on their own businesses, that was not sufficient to displace the reality, observed after consideration of the whole work relationship, that they were employees.[11]

Special Leave

The case is to be heard together with CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting. The Appellant’s submissions were filed last Friday (16 April 2021). At issue are questions about whether the drivers were “employees” for purposes of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth) and “workers” for purpose of Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW).

What next?

Respondents’ submissions in both cases are due to be filed in May, and any replies in early June. After that, the matters will be listed for hearing.

In light of these developments, it might be prudent for staffing agencies to review their independent contracting arrangements, and make contingency plans for managing any that could unravel should the High Court hand down a decision that indicates that they may no longer be sustainable.

Andrew C. Wood


[1] Construction, Forestry, Maritime and Energy Union & Anor v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2021] HCATrans 30 (12 February 2021).

[2] As described by Alsopp CJ on appeal. see fn.5 below.

[3] Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1806 at paras [171] to [181].

[4] Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 122

[5] At para [31].

[6] ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd & Anor v Jamsek & Ors [2021] HCATrans 27 (12 February 2021).

[7] Whitby v ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1934.

[8] At para [213].

[9] Jamsek v ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 119.

[10] At para [19].

[11] At para [248].

“Employer-of-Record” vs “True Employer”

The recent NSW Supreme Court decision in Branded Media Holdings[1] holds some important lessons for recruiters and others who are considering the use of outsourced employer-of-record (EoR) services – especially if they imagine that using EoR services will protect them, in all cases, from liability as the “true employer”.  That’s because statutory and common law liabilities generally rest with the true employer, irrespective of where formal documents might be trying to direct them

In Branded Media, liquidators and deed administrators of two related companies sought directions from the court as to the identity of the employer of specified employees within the Branded Media Group.

The companies were Branded Media Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (Holdings) and Brand New Media Pty Ltd (subject to a deed of arrangement) (BNM). The liquidators and deed administrators’ position was that Holdings was the employer.

The Commonwealth intervened to contend that BNM was the employer. The Commonwealth had advanced more than $1 million in respect of the employees’ unpaid entitlements under the Fair Entitlements Guarantee Act 2012  and stood to recover a substantially higher amount if BNM was held to be the true employer.

The contest was clouded by uncertainty because, whilst the formal documents recorded Holdings as the employer, day-to-day management of the work relationship was conducted by BNM.

The court held that the true employer was BNM. Some telling factors included:

  • Holdings did not conduct any business by which it generated income;
  • Holdings was not the recipient of the services of the employees;
  • the employees provided their services to BNM;
  • Holdings was wholly dependent upon BNM to meet its financial obligations;
  • Holdings did not operate any bank accounts;
  • Holdings did not in fact pay the employees;
  • BNM in fact paid the salaries and wages of the employees;
  • BNM had its logo on some employment forms;
  • business cards used by the employees bore the logo of BNM;
  • the sign-off section of emails sent by the employees referenced BNM;
  • the website referencing the Employees referenced BNM.

You might already be getting a sense of how some of those factors might play out in a case where a staffing agency supplies workers to one of its clients, managing their shifts, providing them with agency uniforms, and binding them to agency policies; but arranging for those workers to be employed “on-the-record” by an outsourced payroll company.  

The Branded Media case is important because the Court clarified the principles that are used to determine which of the two companies was the actual employer. In doing so, it made clear that:

The Court must look to the “substance and reality” in identifying the true employer in these circumstances and would look beyond contractual documentation and to the reality of the manner in which the parties conducted themselves in order to do so.[1]

[The Court may also] have regard to whether the suggested arrangement had an “intelligible business objective” which is “consistent with the financial and administrative organisation of the business”.[2]

The case is also helpful to the extent to which it clarifies that employment-of-record is not a distinct category of employment, but nothing more than an expression to describe an arrangement by which certain of the true employer’s statutory or contractual responsibilities are performed by someone else.

Such an arrangement will not necessarily relieve the true employer of those responsibilities if the EoR fails in performance. And some liabilities, such as the employer’s vicarious liability at common law, may continue to rest with the true employer to the extent to which they derive from the true employer’s notional control of its employees.

The need to identify the true employer will also arise in the context of labour hire licensing prosecutions to the extent to which it may be necessary to determine whether workers of an unlicensed provider who has sought to outsource the obligation to pay its workers to an EoR payroll company may be left with the residue of the statutory obligation to pay sufficient to necessitate the holding of a licence -despite having passed to the EoR a contractual obligation to pay the workers.

Andrew C. Wood


[1] In the matter of Branded Media Holdings Pty Limited (in liquidation); In the matter of Brand New Media Pty Limited (subject to a Deed of Company Arrangement) [2020] NSWSC 557 at [14] adopting Counsel’s submission to that effect.

[2] At [26], developing a further dimension to the test which may be effective to challenge sham arrangements directed at avoidance.

“Tuesday TalkAbout” Summer 2020 Program to Address Recruitment & Staffing Sector “Waypoints”

Tuesday TalkAbout takes a new direction for its Summer 2020 Program of free, short webinars, as we discuss some larger themes at work in the recruitment and staffing sector.

Now, I certainly don’t claim to be a seer or a futurist. I observe and interpret. So, I’m not going to attempt to predict the course of the decade or anything like that.

Instead, I’ll describe the “waypoints”, which I think the recruitment & staffing sector in Australia and New Zealand has reached in eight key areas. ‘

A “waypoint” can be understood as a place on a route or pathway, a stopping point, or a point at which one’s course can be changed.

What the future holds from that point forward largely flows from the decisions and commitments which recruitment & staffing professionals make for their own organisations and professional lives – either intentionally or by default.

The observations and insights that I hope to share reflect experience gained over four decades in legal and workforce consulting practice and in recent work done with RCSA, designing its new Code for Professional Conduct, its grievance intervention guidelines & protocols, its StaffSure certification program, and many of its key resources and templates.

The eight key areas we’ll be discussing are:

1. Professional Conduct (21st January)

RCSA’s new Code for Professional Conduct has been authorised by the ACCC to commence on 8 August 2020. How is it different from previous codes or other industry codes? Why is it different? What statement does it make about emerging professionalism? How might recruitment & staffing professionals respond to it? How is it enforced and administered?

This webinar has now been archived. Please contact me if you would like a link.

2. Quality Management (28th January)

What does “quality” mean in the context of the work undertaken by recruitment & staffing professionals as labour market enablers and intermediaries. Does the ISO 9001 definition of “quality” say it all? How well does the “customer focus” requirement stand up to the professional conduct responsibilities of recruitment & staffing professionals? Is quality perceived as outcome or experience? Is it even an either/or question?

This webinar has now been archived. Please contact me if you would like a link.

3. Risk Management (4th February)

We know (at least I hope we do) that risk is defined for the purposes of risk management and quality management standards as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives”. But how might risk be categorised to be more manageable for recruitment & staffing professionals? What sorts of risk do recruitment & staffing professionals face in 2020? At what points does risk intersect with professionalism and quality? How can risk be managed to minimise its effects on professional and quality objectives?

This webinar has now been archived. Please contact me if you would like a link.

4. Collaboration (11th February)

What is “collaboration”, really? Why is it important for recruitment & staffing professionals in 2020? Is collaboration possible with customers and clients? Candidates? Competitors? Consultants? If so, how is achieved? How is it managed and maintained?

This webinar has now been archived. Please contact me if you would like a link.

5. Doing Business (18th February)

Something is wrong if you’re not upgrading your terms of business at least as frequently as your mobile phone! Wonder why you’re getting pushback from clients who won’t pay you that “introduction fee”, or who won’t sign up to your “all-care-no-responsibility” conditions? Terms of business modelled on 1980s recruitment & staffing practices and 1980s legal culture are no longer viable. In this session, we explain why and talk about what you can do about that.

This webinar has now been archived. Please contact me if you would like a link.

6. Conflict & Dispute Resolution (25th February)

Even for those who might be energised by conflict, there comes a point when stocks of energy and finances to meet the crushing cost of feeding conflict, run low. What is your conflict/ dispute profile? Do you still handle business disputes like it’s the 1980s and you’re a bank? Or have you found a better way? What are your options in 2020? What distinguishes the way you handle conflict and disputes as “professional”?

View the recorded Conflict & Dispute Resolution “Waypoint” webinar here

7. Employment Shaping (3rd March)

What is the difference between legitimate employment shaping and sham contracting or avoidance? How much flexibility is there to shape an employment relationship to suit labour market conditions in 2020? What are the limits? How do you know if you are approaching or transgressing them? Are there any “golden rules”. If so, what are they and how do you apply them?

View the recorded Employment Shaping “Waypoint” webinar here

8. Independent contractor on-hire (10th March)

What are the main challenges to independent contractor on-hire in 2020? Is the business integration test still reliable? What investigations should a recruitment & staffing professional undertake to ensure that independent contractor engagement and on-hire models are compliant with a wide range of regulatory requirements and are not exploitative?

Register for the Independent Contractor On-Hire “Waypoint” webinar here

I do hope you’ll join me when WorkAccord’s Tuesday TalkAbout Summer Program returns at 8:30 am AEDT on Tuesday 21 January 2020 and I’d love to learn of any questions you might have in advance.

 

Andrew C. Wood

Let’s Shed Light on Recruitment Fees!

 

Slide1Temp-to-Perm Fees, Agency-Switching Fees, Introduction Fees and Release Fees.

I hope you’ll join me when we shed light on the topic of Recruitment Fees in two separate webinars planned for Thursday 22nd November and Thursday 29th November at 10:30 am AEDT.

In our first webinar, you’ll learn how to make binding and enforceable recruitment fee agreements.

In our second webinar, you’ll learn how to manage fee recruitment disputes ethically and professionally.

You can find out more about the webinars in my Recruiters’ Casebook blog here.

 

Andrew C. Wood, Hon FRCSA (Life)

Will your outsourced payroll arrangements alter your requirements to have a labour hire license? Probably not.

As attempts by Australia’s labor states to create a multi-jurisdiction, labour hire licensing scheme gain critical mass, it is becoming more important, and perhaps a little easier, to make comparisons and ask questions at a practical level rather than merely at a policy or ideological level.

One such question, which seems to be causing concern amongst industry participants, relates to the involvement of payroll providers in labour hire arrangements. Kudos, therefore, to the industry participants, who have appreciated the detail and complexity of the legislation well enough to formulate the following question:

Will our outsourced payroll arrangements alter our requirements to have a labour hire license?

The answer is, “Probably not”.

Let’s say you provide labour hire services – i.e. you engage a worker and supply that worker to another person (a host) to do work.

Your engagement of that worker creates an obligation – and it’s your obligation – to pay your worker for her or his work. You can’t escape that obligation by entering into a pay-when-paid-by-client arrangement. And, importantly, you can’t escape it by outsourcing your payroll function to a third-party payroll provider. It’s still your source obligation; and it is sourced in the work/wage or work/remuneration bargain that you made with your worker.

Neither, in most cases, can you transfer your worker to the payroll company. As the High Court has reminded us:

No worker is an asset in the employer’s balance sheet to be bought or sold.

So, whilst ever you continue to engage the worker, you have a payment obligation – even if a payroll company is going to perform it for you.

Now, I’ve heard it suggested from time to time, that terms and conditions of appointment of a payroll provider often attempt to shift responsibility for engaging the worker onto the payroll provider. They might say something like:

 You, the payroll provider, agree that you employ the worker and are responsible for all employer obligations.

In my opinion, you will have to be especially careful if your terms of business say anything like that – and that’s so regardless of whether you are the payroll provider or the labour hire provider.

The work/wage or work/remuneration bargain is made between the engager and the worker. It’s not something that you can transfer on paper – even if you have a paper consent from the worker and payroll provider – because the paper transfer and consent might not reflect the reality of the situation if it’s actually you, who continue to supply the worker to your client and are getting paid for it.

Even though there may be some very limited circumstances in which you could successfully transfer a worker’s engagement to a payroll company, it may still be important for you to ensure that you have a licence.

Remember, you can’t transfer a worker whom you haven’t first engaged. How did the worker become engaged with you in the first place? Did you advertise, or hold out that you were willing to provide labour hire services? Under all three state schemes, you must not advertise or hold yourself out as willing to provide labour hire services unless you have a licence that is in force.

If your attempt to appoint a payroll provider is designed to circumvent or avoid an obligation imposed upon you by the labour hire licensing legislation, you may also have committed an avoidance offence. Your client, and indeed your payroll provider, may be obligated to report the attempt as an avoidance arrangement under the reporting provisions of the legislation.

If you DO successfully transfer the worker to the payroll company, remember:

  • It’s probably not just the payroll function that you have transferred – it’s likely to be pretty much the whole show; and it might be difficult to know what your client will be paying you for.

Ask yourself: Are you still providing what you agreed with your client you would provide? If you’re no longer providing what you agreed with your client to provide, you might find that your agreement with your client (including its terms and conditions) will be swept aside by a court, as happened in Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd.[i]

  • Perhaps you’re being paid a type of pay-as-you-go placement fee and you’re really acting in the role of a private employment agent (PEA) providing placement services.

Ask yourself: Do your terms of business support that characterization of your arrangement; and do they accurately reflect the arrangement?

  • Even if that is the case, you may still require a labour hire license if, as a PEA, you are doing anything more than merely providing a recruitment or placement service.

For example: If you are arranging safety inductions, PPE,  accommodation,  transport, message handling to coordinate worker attendance at the worksite etc, you will not have the benefit of the private employment agent exception under the Queensland and South Australian legislation; and you may be caught by the extended coverage provisions in the Victorian legislation that relate to PEA’s, who arrange accommodation; or Contractor Management Companies, who recruit and place independent contractors.

  • You may also require a PEA licence in those states and territories that still have them.

Ask yourself: Do you need and do you have a PEA licence?

  • Your arrangement is likely to convert the payroll provider into a labour hire provider if the payroll provider now has to supply the worker to the user or “host”.

Ask yourself: Does your payroll provider have a labour hire licence? If not, you may need to consider whether you have an ancillary liability arising from placing workers with unlicensed labour hire providers. The ancillary liability penalties can be as severe as those imposed upon the principal offender.

  • You may have made a type of split placement – i.e. you have placed the worker operationally with the host, but administratively with the payroll provider. In doing so, you may have implicated your client in the offence of dealing with an unlicensed labour hire provider if either you or your payroll providers are unlicensed.

If your attempt to transfer the worker to the payroll company was NOT effective, – and there may be a number of reasons why it will not be effective – then you would clearly remain the labour hire provider. You will need a licence – even though the payroll provider is paying the worker.

The interactions between payroll arrangements and the coverage and avoidance provisions of the labour hire licensing legislation are complex and are affected by nuances in definitions, exclusions and extensions. That will mean that payroll providers (and labour hire providers) will need to exercise special care to understand the effects of a transfer of payroll responsibility from a labour hire provider. They will need to be thoroughly familiar with the legislation and will need to scrutinize the terms and conditions upon which the transfer of payroll responsibility takes place.

But wait! There’s more…

So far, we’ve only been discussing the situation where a labour hire provider appoints a payroll provider. There’s also the possibility that the payroll provider might be appointed by the client (host) or even by the worker. There’s the additional possibility that the payroll provider is, in fact, the worker’s own incorporated entity. That’s a whole other story!

Teacher 3

 

 

Andrew C. Wood

 

[i] [2015] FCAFC 37 per North and Bromberg JJ at [paras 215 to 218].

This is an opinion piece intended to promote public discussion. It is not, and should not be relied on as legal advice. If you do want legal advice, please seek it from a lawyer, who is familiar your industry and with the laws that apply in the jurisdictions where you carry on business. Your industry associations or local Law Societies may be able to help you to find professional legal advisors, who can assist you.

 

“No Refund” terms & conditions result in $750,000 fine, injunctions and costs orders.

If your terms and conditions expressly or impliedly exclude refund remedies under the Australian Consumer Law, you might be in for a nasty shock.

In a recent case, the Australian Federal Court imposed, by consent, fines of $750,000, injunctions and costs orders (totaling a further $50,000) on MSY Group Pty Ltd, MSY Technology Pty Ltd and M.S.Y. Technology (NSW) Pty Ltd for publishing, including on the companies’ website, business terms and conditions that impliedly excluded remedies available under the Australian Consumer Law (ACL).

As a result, the Court declared that the respondents:

  • “engaged in conduct that was misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive, in contravention of s 18 of the ACL;
  • “made false or misleading representations in relation to the existence, exclusion or effect of any condition, warranty, guarantee, right or remedy in contravention of s. 29(1)(m) of the ACL; and
  • ” made false or misleading representations in relation to a requirement to pay for a contractual right that is wholly or partly equivalent to any condition, warranty, guarantee, right or remedy in contravention of s 29(1)(n) of the ACL.

What is especially important about this case is that the Court held that a contravention of these ACL provisions could occur, where MSY’s terms of business and representations:

… impliedly represented to consumers that their rights were limited when that was not the case.

…were silent in response to the consumer’s reference to their specific ACL rights and impliedly represented that MSY … was not required to provide an ACL remedy to consumers.

(My underlining).

The decision creates a risk for businesses that insert additional or alternative “remedies” – such as candidate replacement “guarantees” or indemnities – into their terms of business (or who answer questions raised by consumers about their remedies for defective services) and say nothing about the availability of the ACL remedies in circumstances where the ACL remedies apply.

The ACCC has been active, recently, in challenging unfair terms and conduct that may be in breach of the ACL. If it’s been a while since you last had your terms of business reviewed, you might do well to have your lawyers review them for you against the background of recent developments in this area.

And if your customer-facing staff are not familiar with the ACL remedies, it might be worth investing in some training.

It could be a lot less expensive than the $800,000 in fines and costs ordered in this case!

Andrew C. Wood

Uber drivers confirmed as “employees” by UK Employment Appeal Tribunal.

silhouette-of-scaleOn 10th November 2017, the UK Employment Appeal Tribunal delivered its judgment in Uber & Ors v Aslam & Ors [PDF].   The decision will be of interest to agencies and workers operating in the “Gig economy. Here is a brief summary.

Background

Members of the Uber Group had appealed from an earlier decision of the Employment Tribunal, which found that Uber drivers in London were “workers” within the meaning of the Employment Rights Act 1996, the Working Time Regulations 1998 and the National Minimum Wage Act 1998; and that any Uber driver who had the Uber app switched on, was within the territory in which they were authorised to work (London) and was able and willing to accept assignments was working for Uber London Ltd.

Appeal

A key ground in Uber’s appeal was that the Employment Tribunal had mischaracterised the true relationship between Uber and its drivers – that rather than being one of employment, it was one of agency in accordance with which Uber provided booking services as agent for its drivers.

Uber pointed to provisions in its suite of contracts and terms of businesss, which it contended supported its view.

Outcome

The Employment Appeal Tribunal disagreed and dismissed Uber’s appeal. At the time of writing it is understood that Uber intends to take a further appeal to the UK Supreme Court.

Take-away points

In the meantime, there are a few quick points that can be made about the EAT decision.

  1. It is the reality of the situation that matters. The Appeal Tribunal said:

[The Employment Tribunal] was entitled to disregard the terms in the written agreements and the labels used therein.

…the true agreement between the parties was not one in which [Uber London Ltd] acted as the drivers’ agent.

  1. Control still matters. The Appeal Tribunal said:

 The [Employment Tribunal]…was entitled to look at all factors to determine whether this was a case in which the … Uber drivers were entering into contracts with passengers as part of their own business undertakings. Seeing that they were subjected to control on the part of [Uber London Ltd] was an indication that they were not.

  1. These matters will continue to be decided on a case by case basis. The Appeal Tribunal said:

Inevitably the assessment [the ET] had carried out was fact-and context-specific.

Moving forward

It will be interesting to see what the Supreme Court makes of this.

Whilst, it would seem possible, in theory, to construct an agency relationship of the type which Uber contended for in this case, one might wonder whether Uber would have done better to construct the agency and booking service between it and the riders, rather than between Uber and the drivers.

It could also be important to recognise that this might not really be a case, where the Employment Appeal Tribunal said that the written documentation doesn’t matter … it’s perhaps more a case of making sure that the written documentation gets it right – i.e. that it reflects the true relationship between the parties.

 

Andrew C. Wood